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John Chipman Gray, Legal Formalism, and
the Transformation of Perpetuities Law
STEPHEN A. SIEGEL*
The author uses John Chipman Gray's classic treatise, The
Rule Against Perpetuities, as the focal point of an analysis of
legal formalism. With the advent of legal formalism, pertpetui-
ties law was reduced to a single rule that courts applied
mechanically and with little deference to policy and individu-
alized justice. Exploring the jurisprudence of formalism, the
author concludes that current change in the perpetuities doc-
trine is based on a rejection of the Rule's formalist
underpinnings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Perpetuities law is commonly regarded as ancient, static, and
certainly unaffected by developments in legal philosophy.1 Yet this
article's thesis is that contemporary perpetuities law dates from
the late nineteenth century, when the inherited tradition for han-
dling perpetuity problems was revised extensively to reflect and
exemplify legal formalism'-the style of jurisprudence then coming
into vogue. Moreover, perpetuities law is currently rife with con-
troversy that can be understood only as a renewed jurisprudential
conflict.
John Chipman Gray's classic treatise, The Rule Against Per-
petuities,s was the catalyst of the nineteenth-century transforma-
* Professor, De Paul University College of Law; A.B., Columbia University; J.D.,
LL.M., Harvard University.
1. Perpetuities law is concerned with marking the extent to which current property
holders can impose their control of wealth on future generations. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF PROPERTY §§ 9-13 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1979); L. SiMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND (1955) [hereinafter cited as L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY].
2. For a description of formalism, see infra text accompanying notes 42-45.
3. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1st ed. 1886) [hereinafter cited as J. GRAY,
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tion of perpetuities law. Few works of legal scholarship have had
the impact and longevity of this treatise. Even the English judici-
ary immediately treated it as authoritative, a status rarely ac-
corded to the work of a living, let alone American, author." Al-
though nearly a century old, and not updated since 1942,1 the
treatise continues to be cited frequently as authority for current
law." Gray's work still dominates its field. The import of this arti-
cle is that Gray's anticipation and exemplification of formalism ac-
counts for his treatise's positive reception and that the rejection of
Gray's formalist jurisprudence underlies the present movement to
reform perpetuities law.
A historical perspective is necessary to support these conten-
tions. Accordingly, Part II of this article examines perpetuities law
before the late nineteenth century, while Part III discusses the
changes that Gray introduced. Part IV elucidates current contro-
versies in perpetuities law and the interpretation of dispositive in-
struments7 as a struggle between formalism and more modern no-
tions of jurisprudence. This section also suggests a revision of
generally accepted ideas of the overall history of property law, and
of the nature of legal formalism.
II. PERPETUITIES BEFORE GRAY-THE RULES AGAINST
PERPETUITIES
Before the late nineteenth century, the legal profession re-
garded perpetuities law as a significant part of the policy favoring
free alienability of property.8 Elizabethan lawyers introduced the
PEPETurrmEs]. Gray's classic formulation of the Rule Against Perpetuities ("the Rule") is:
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest." J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITES § 201
(2d ed. 1906).
4. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 3-4, 12 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 215 (1926).
5. The fourth edition, edited by Roland Gray, added case citations to existing notes. J.
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPmurrms (R. Gray 4th ed. 1942). The text remained virtually
unchanged from the first edition.
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 10, 43, 104; L. SIMEs,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS 253, 263 (1966) [hereinafter cited as L. SIMES,
FuTURE INTERESTS]. The use of Gray's work as authority contrasts with citations to H. STE-
PHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883), and other older treatises, which are used to
illustrate the development of the law.
7. Dispositive instruments include deeds and wills.
8. This is one of the oldest and most important social policies embraced by Anglo-
American law. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 193-94; Bordwell, Alienability and Per-
petuities (pt. 1), 22 IOWA L. REv. 437, 437-41 (1937); Fox, The Criticism of Cases, 6 HARv.
L. REV.* 195, 195-97 (1892); Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on
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term "perpetuity" during the sixteenth century to describe one re-
cently arisen form of restraint-the use of future interests9 to con-
trol the devolution of wealth, usually in an attempt to keep it
within the family indefinitely. 10 Although desired by landowners,
the English courts thought that perpetuities were harmful to the
economic, social, and political life of the realm." The judiciary
thought that perpetuities interfered with commerce, fostered disci-
pline problems by assuring the youth their inheritance, and al-
lowed traitors' wealth to pass to their families rather than to be
forfeited to the crown.1 2 Perpetuities, they said, "f[ought] against
God, for pretend[ing] to such a stability in human affairs, as the
nature of them admits not of."'
the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 19, 27-34 (1977).
Some contemporary commentators also recognize the link between perpetuities law and
the policy favoring the free alienability of property. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 10 (citing Gray); L. SiMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at
237; see also J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 13-18 (1956) (examin-
ing reasons for the continued existence of the Rule); Bostick, Loosening the Grip of the
Dead Hand: Shall We Abolish Legal Future Interests in Land?, 32 VAqN. L. REv. 1061,
1078-82, 1086-87 (1979) (review of Rule's principal problems).
9. L. SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 2, states: "[T]he essence of a future
interest is that (1) it involves the privilege of possession or enjoyment in the future, and (2)
it is looked upon as a portion of the total ownership of the land or other thing which is its
subject matter." See also C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PROPERTY 93 n.1
(1962) ("Future interests may also exist in personal property and in equitable interests in
both real and personal property.".
10. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 197-98; Bordwell, supra note 8, at 437-38.
Before the sixteenth century, landowners rarely used future interests to control the dev-
olution of property because they could control their wealth more easily by conveying fee
tails and uses. But Taltarum's Case, Y.B. Mich. 12 Edw. 4, f. 19, pl. 25 (1472), which allowed
a tenant in tail to convey a fee simple by suffering a common recovery, and the Statute of
Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10, which turned uses into legal estates, destroyed the usefulness
of these devices. Conveyancers then turned to future interests as a means of controlling
their land. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 82-83; Haskins, supra note 8, at 27-32.
Not surprisingly, Elizabethan judges disliked perpetuities because they caused the problems
that the judges previously had encountered with fee tails. See, e.g., 7 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 4, at 194-96, 198-202; 3 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 247, 260 (B. Montagu ed.
1859).
11. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 200-09.
12. See, e.g., Duke of Marlborough v. Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 409-10, 415-17, 28 Eng.
Rep. 741, 743, 745-46 (Ch. 1859); Pills v. Brown, Palmer 131, 138, 81 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1016
(K.B. 1620) (Dodderidge, J., dissenting) (also cited as Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng.
Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620)), translated in J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
241 (2d ed. 1979); see also 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 198-222; W. LEwIS, THE LAW
OF PERPETUITY 49 (Am. ed. 1846); 3 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 10, at 260.
13. The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 32, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 949 (1682). Al-
though the quote is from Chancellor Nottingham, the idea seems to date from Elizabethan
times. See Pills v. Brown, Palmer 131, 81 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1620) (Dodderidge, J., dis-
senting), translated in J. BAKER, supra note 12, at 29.
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Over the centuries, the judicial response to these perceived
evils varied.1 4 But until the late nineteenth century, the judiciary
never attempted to address perpetuities with a single rule. Rather,
groups of unsystematically related rules developed, each directed
to some aspect of the problem. 15 For example, one set of rules fo-
cused on entailed estates.1 " Since the fifteenth century, the judici-
ary had allowed the present occupant of a fee tail to convey freely
a fee simple by using the complex system of common recovery.17
Using common recoveries, the present occupant destroyed all fu-
ture interests expectant on his estate. By judicial fiat, the occupant
was given complete power of alienation.
Still, use of the common recovery as a means of "unfettering"
entailed estates was not sufficient to end these perpetuities. In the
sixteenth century, property holders began devising a variety of ar-
rangements aimed at' preventing the present occupant of an en-
tailed estate from "suffering" a common recovery.18 Articulating a
number of rules consistent with their opposition to the fee tail, the
courts rejected these attempts to circumvent their policy against
inalienable freeholds.1' It was only due to the doctrine of common
14. Haskins, supra note 8, at 37-46; see 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 201-14
(contrasting "older rules" with "modern rule" against perpetuities).
15. This article is limited to those rules still recognized by the modern lawyer. Parts of
the complete mosaic of rules constituting the original perpetuity doctrine are too obsolete
and complex to be fully studied in this article. For a discussion of some of these rules, see
infra notes 17, 19, 21, 23-24, 31 & 75.
16. An entailed estate was a grant to a person and his lineal descendants. The Statute
De Donis Conditionalibus, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 1, permitted the present occupant of a fee
tail to convey his property for his life only. The property thus would descend from genera-
tion to generation. See S. MILSON, HISTOlICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 144-46
(1969); C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 9, at 37-40. Because the Statute Quia Emptores Terrarum,
1290, 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1, did not apply to entails, the full panoply of common-law future
interests, as well as executory interests, could also follow the estate tail. This further con-
trolled the devolution of property. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 86; C. MOYNIHAN,
supra note 9, at 23.
17. A common recovery was a lawsuit between fictious parties that circumvented the
entail, thereby defeating the perpetuity. In the nineteenth century, the courts allowed disen-
tailing by an appropriate conveyance. See T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COM-
MON LAW 620-23 (5th ed. 1956); A. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND
LAW 115-29 (1961).
18. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 99-100, 205-09. For example, in Mary Port-
ington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976 (K.B. 1614), the testator devised a fee tail
determinable upon the tenant's doing any act that prevented the property from remaining
entailed.
19. For example, one rule created by the courts was that a devise of leasehold in tail
transfers the devisor's entire interest. See Bennett v. Lewknor, 1 Rolle 357, 81 Eng. Rep.
531 (K.B. 1616), described in J. GRAY, PE'E'rurrms, aupra note 3, § 154; Leventhorp v.
Ashbie, I Rolle Ab. device L. pl. 1 (1635), described in 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at
[Vol. 36:439
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recovery and these protective rules that English law and equity, as
Lord Keeper Northington observed, "admitted no perpetuities by
way of entail."
20
Another constellation of rules focused on remainders. 1 Begin-
ning in the late sixteenth century, the English judiciary developed
the distinction between vested and contingent remainders" into
rules designed to control perpetuities. 5 The principal means of
208, 219-20.
The subterfuge in these cases relied on the precedent that common recoveries could be
brought only by a present occupant with seisin, and leaseholders have no seisin. Thus, by
devising a term of 200 years in tail, the devisor denied the present tenant seisin and dis-
abled him from commencing a recovery. The court's rule, however, gave the tenant in tail
the whole interest, which was then freely alienable. See also Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep.
40a, 41a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 314 (K.B. 1606) (ability of tenant in tail to convey fee simple
through common recovery is "inseparable incident" of fee tail); 7 W. HoLswoRTH, supra
note 4, at 99-100, 205-09, 219-22.
20. Duke of Marlborough v. Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1759); see
also 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 207.
21. A remainder is "a future interest created in a transferee that can become a posses-
sory estate only on the expiration of a prior estate created in favor of another transferee by
the same instrument." C. MomHiA, supra note 9, at 110. The discussion of remainders in
this article is limited to the rules settled on by the English courts. The English courts,
however, used and subsequently abandoned a number of other rules. For example, there is
evidence that the English courts initially controlled the perpetuities problems inherent in
remainders by allowing a life tenant, like a tenant in tail, to convey a fee simple by using a
common recovery. Midsixteenth-century statutes foreclosed this practice and the courts for-
mulated other doctrines to effectuate their policy. See T. PLucKNEr, supra note 17, at 620;,
Bordwell, Alienability and Perpetuities (pts. 3, 4 & 6), 24 IOWA L. Riv. 1, 57-58, 636 (1938),
25 IOWA L. REv. 707, 712 (1940). One consequence of this change was the development of
the rule against "double possibilities" to control remainders. See infra note 75.
22. A contingent remainder is a present interest in an estate that is to be enjoyed in the
future or upon the happening of a necessary event. Contingent remainders are subject to the
contemporary Rule Against Perpetuities. The English courts considered the contingent re-
mainder unalienable because it represented only a possibility of acquiring an estate in land.
Today, the policy is to permit contingent remainders to be alienable like other future inter-
ests. Contingent remainders are inheritable and devisable. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 9, at
123-28.
A vested remainder is an estate that is "limited to a person in existence and ascer-
tained" and not subject to any condition precedent other than the natural expiration of the
preceding estate. Id. at 116. Vested remainders are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. If not defeated, the vested remainder then becomes a possessory interest at the end of
the preceding estate. Vested remainders are alienable, devisable, and descendible. Id.
23. Prior to the midsixteenth century, conveyancers rarely used contingent remainders.
Thus the principal cases and primary concerns shaping the rules governing contingent re-
mainders are decisions of the early modern, not medieval, era. The feudal concept of seisin
may have influenced, but did not dictate, the development of remainder rules. Rather, the
pervasive impact of the early modern perpetuities rules helped fashion the concepts of
vested and contingent remainders. See 7 W. HoLDSWOftTH, supra note 4, at 82-101; S. MIL-
SON, supra note 16, at 163-68, 200-01 (discussing rationale for, and origin of, remainders); T.
PLUCKNETr, supra note 17, at 590-92; Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Dis-
card its Vest? (pt. 2), 56 MICH. L. REv. 887, 888-96 (1958).
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control was voiding contingent remainders that failed to vest at or
before the termination of the estate upon which they were expec-
tant. 4 The destructibility of contingent remainders, coupled with
the contingent character of any remainder granted to an unborn
person," meant that property subject to remainders was freely
alienable if the present occupant and the living remaindermen con-
sented. Thus, the fee was subject to the wishes of the living, not
the past, generation. 6
English property owners objected to these judicial attempts to
promote the alienability of their property, and devised methods to
circumvent the consequences of the doctrine of destructibility.
This attempt was partially successful; the eighteenth-century judi-
ciary held that the insertion of a clause "to trustees to preserve
contingent remainders" between the last vested estate and the ex-
pectant contingent remainder protected the contingent remainder
from willful destruction. 7 The introduction of this provision aug-
mented property holders' control over the transferability of their
land, subject to two qualifications. First, courts would not permit
the "trustee" clause to preserve contingent remainders destroyed
by the natural termination of the preceding vested estate.28 Sec-
ond, the settlor's reach was limited by the rule, fashioned in the
struggle against unbarrable entails but now brought into new
prominence, that no limitations were valid after a remainder to an
unborn person.'9 Together, these limitations permitted property
24. This doctrine is known as the destructibility of contingent remainders. Under the
destructibility doctrine, courts allowed willful (i.e., artificial) destruction by voiding contin-
gent remainders if conditions precedent failed to occur before the terminating act. The de-
structibility of contingent remainders is discussed in 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at
104-16; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 9, at 128-33. Today, many states have abolished the doc-
trine of destructibility of contingent remainders.
25. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 111-14.
26. A. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 215.
27. The landholders' use of trustees to preserve contingent remainders is discussed in 7
W. HOLDSWORTH, aupra note 4, at 111-14; R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY 194-95 (4th ed. 1975); C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 9, at 133-34; L. SiMEs, FUTURE INTER-
EsTS, supra note 1, at 39-40. An example of this device is a grant to B for life, with remain-
der to trustees X, Y, and Z for the life of B in trust for B and to preserve contingent
remainders, with remainder to B's eldest male child. Assuming B has no children, the re-
mainder to the trustees is vested and able to support the expectant contingent remainder.
Dormer v. Packhurst, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1740).
28. This followed from giving the trustees a life estate pur autre vie (for the life of the
holder of the previous vested estate). Thus, the trustee's estate terminated upon the benefi-
ciary's death. See example supra note 27; R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 27, at 195.
29. The rule is illustrated by a disposition to B for life, then to B's eldest child for life,
then to B's eldest grandchild and his heirs. If B had no children at the time of the grant,
then the limitation to the grandchild is void ab initio. This interpretation first appeared in
[Vol. 36:439
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holders to use remainders to control the devolution and alienabil-
ity of property no further than the end of the present generation
and the actual minority, if any, of the next.80
The English courts also formulated additional rules to prevent
perpetuities created by executory interests.31 One rule required
that any interest created by use or devise, which otherwise con-
formed to the definition of a remainder, be treated as a remain-
der, 2 and thus subject to the previously discussed doctrines
Perrot's Case, Moore K.B. 368, 72 Eng. Rep. 634 (K.B. 1594), and may be traced back to
1487; it is known as the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 Ch. D. 494 (1889). 7 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 4, at 91-92, 209-14; R. MEGARY & H. WADE, supra note 27, at 200-07;
Sweet, The Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, 25 L.Q. REv. 385, 388-96 (1909). The English courts
often ignored the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell until its rise to prominence in Duke of Marl-
borough v. Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1759). See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 4, at 209-14; Sweet, supra, at 396-97.
30. To illustrate that this follows from the above rules, consider the typical grant to B
for life, then to trustees, then to B's eldest male child. If B has no male child living at his
death, then the remainder to that child fails and the property reverts to the grantor's estate.
If there is a male child, then he takes, but is not able to alienate freely until reaching his
majority. Cf. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 27, at 207 (modern rule against perpetu-
ities "modelled upon the period for which the power of alienation could normally be re-
strained in settlements operating at common law"); A. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 215.
31. An executory interest is a contingent future interest that: 1) cannot qualify as a
remainder; 2) is always in favor of the conveyee; and 3) takes effect when the contingency
happens as a springing or shifting use under the Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10, or
the Statute of Wills, 1548, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 9, at 192-96; L.
SimEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 25-28. As with the rules concerning remainders,
see supra note 21-23, this article discusses only those executory interests rules finally settled
on by the English courts. At first, the courts met the perpetuities problems arising from
executory interests by subjecting these interests to the destructibility rules governing re-
mainders. See Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (K.B. 1595); 7 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 123-25; Haskins, supra note 8, at 31. But when the Court of
the Exchequer began protecting the beneficiaries of executory interests, the law courts re-
lented and held these interests indestructible. See Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng.
Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620); Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 946, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 (K.B. 1609); 7 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 137-41; T. PLUcKNrr, supra note 17, at 594-95.
Nevertheless, the law courts effectively circumscribed the length of time that executory
interests could postpone alienability to the end of the presently living generation. For exam-
ple, in a devise to A of a term of years, the court viewed a limitation to A and his heirs of
body as a relinquishment of the devisor's entire interest even though the gift to A was de-
feasible if A died without leaving issue. See Child v. Baylie, Cro. Jac. 459, 79 Eng. Rep. 393
(K.B. 1618); see also The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 19-20, 22, 35-37, 22 Eng.
Rep. 931, 942-43, 944, 952-53 (1682); 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 219-20; Haskins,
supra note 8, at 41. Chancellor Nottingham intervened in 1682. In contravention of the
opinion of the law judges, but with the approval of the House of Lords, he revoked these
limits in The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682). See Barry, The
Duke of Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L. Rzv. 538, 557-61 (1937); Haskins, supra note 8, at 38-45.
32. This limitation on perpetuities is known as the Rule in Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wins.
Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (K.B. 1670), and dates back to Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep.
120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (K.B. 1595). See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 127-28; C.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 9, at 200-03; L. SImEs, FUTuRE INTzRzSTs, supra note 6, at 36.
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designed to prevent perpetuities.33 Another rule was known as the
rule against remote vesting. This rule governed perpetuity
problems involving executory interests that could not be turned
into common-law remainders. Its net effect was to allow property
holders to suspend the alienability of property for up to twenty-
one years beyond the lives of the present generation."4
In summary, until the late nineteenth century, English courts
addressed perpetuity problems by using a mosaic of rules with no
overall systematic relationship, either in logic or result. The lack of
a perceived system35 of general principles and a technique for ap-
plying them proved inconsequential because rules of law were not
expected to be logically interconnected.3 6 Rather than doctrinal
consistency, various institutions developed and elaborated upon
perpetuities law with a concern for policy and certainty. 7 The
law's complex pattern followed from the varying influence and con-
tributions of different sources: law courts, Chancery, the House of
Lords (acting as the court of last resort), and Parliament." These
institutions influenced the complexity of the developing perpetu-
ities law as notions of where to draw the line between living and
dead hand control changed over time.3 9 The rules' satisfactory bal-
ance of conflicting values was the basis of their acceptance.
III. PERPETUITIES AFTER GRAY-THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES
In the nineteenth century, two successive revolutions in juris-
prudential thought transformed Anglo-American law. First, in the
early part of the century, jurists accepted the view that law should
33. See supra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
34. Haskins, supra note 8, at 21, 46. The rule against remote vesting is the most gener-
ous to "dead hand" control. At its origin, the rule was known as the rule of perpetuities
because it increased the extent of the landowner's control over the devolution of his
property.
35. "System" refers to the modern notion of rules structurally related to each other as
inferences from a few basic premises. See Siegel, The Aristotelian Basis of English Law
1450-1800, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 18, 18-19 (1981).
36. Before 1800, jurists conceived of the law as a system in which legal rules related to
one another in an intricate mosaic, as in the relationship among the various rules against
perpetuities. Id. at 20-21.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 156-62.
38. For the contribution of the Chancery Court to the development of the perpetuities
laws, see supra note 31. For a discussion of the role of the House of Lords, see supra notes
27 & 31. For Parliament's contribution, see Act of 1699, 10 & 11 Wil. 3, ch. 16, confirming
Reeve v. Long, 3 Lev. 408, 83 Eng. Rep. 754 (1695), discussed in 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 4, at 106-07, 115 and supra note 21.
39. See Haskins, supra note 8, at 20-22, 45-46.
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be systematic.40 Lawyers began to subscribe to the view that each
area of the law ultimately consists of a few basic principles and
conceptions derived from notions of "natural justice and enlight-
ened public policy. '41 Judicial elaboration of these principles and
concepts established the innumerable rules of each area of the law.
This suggested that the myriad of rules composing a substantive
legal area had a logical unity and, therefore, should not be viewed
as a substantially unrelated mosaic.
Second, in the latter third of the nineteenth century, jurists
insisted that law was not only systematic, but also formal. 2 By the
term formal, they meant that the law was an objective and apoliti-
cal science. With the advent of formalism and its subsequent dom-
ination of jurisprudential thought, areas of law could no longer be
understood as grounded in the subjective value and policy choices
inherent in the notion of natural justice and enlightened public
policy. Jurists believed that they no longer needed to go beyond
the boundaries of a substantive legal field to explain its underlying
principles. 3 Rather than devise legal concepts, such as considera-
tion in contract, intent in torts, and lease in property, as functional
means to achieve debatable value and policy choices, formalists
viewed these notions as self-sufficient ends found solely in the
study of each legal area." This suggested that the law's innumera-
ble rules were logical and mechanical deductions from autonomous
legal principles and conceptions that legal scholars had discerned
in past cases.'
40. See supra notes 35-36.
41. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267-68 (1854);
see Siegel, supra note 35, at 59. See generally Horwitz, The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and
Economic Thought, 19 J.L. & EcON. 621 (1976).
42. On the rise of formalism in America, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
530-48 (1973); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
G. GILMORE, AGES]; M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
253-66 (1977); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 20-37 (1980) [hereinafter cited as G. WHITE,
TORT]; Nelson, Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth Century America, 87 HAiv. L. REv. 513 (1974). For a discussion of formalism in
England, see P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 345-58, 388-97, 660-
71 (1979) [hereinafter cited as P. ATIYAH, CONTRACT]. Formalism in Europe is discussed in J.
MERRYMAN, THE CivnL LAW TRADITION 65-72 (1969).
43. See, e.g., Bordwell, supra note 21, at 734-36; Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); authorities cited supra note 42.
44. See, e.g., C. LANGDELL, CASES ON CONTRACTS vi-vii (1871); authorities cited supra
note 42.
45. The difference between early and later nineteenth century approaches to systemiza-
tion is illustrated by Langdell's treatment of the "mailbox rule" in contract law. After de-
ducing from his legal conception of contract that an acceptance is effective upon delivery
and not upon dispatch, Langdell dismissed opposing arguments based on justice and utility
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Like other areas of the law,' perpetuities law reflects both the
rise of systemization and the shift in its ultimate basis from policy
to legal conceptions. The earlier style of systemization appeared in
the perpetuities field with the publication of William Lewis's Law
of Perpetuity in 1846.47 Lewis wrote, although more tentatively
than his successors, of a "harmony of principles" and "symmetry,"
and of a "rule," not rules, against perpetuities. 5 Yet the author,
reflecting the jurisprudence of his time, based the rule on policy
rather than legal principle. For example, Lewis opened with an ex-
planation of both the need to allow and to regulate private prop-
erty, and the need to empower and to control the dead hand;49 he
described the law's objective as
preserving harmony between the diversified elements which con-
stitute the sources of national prosperity, at a point at which
they are most likely to clash, by securing the necessary freedom
of commerce in the alienation and pledge of every species of
property, on the one hand, and the proper and reasonable re-
gard to private and family purposes in the settlement of prop-
erty, on the other. 50
Despite Lewis's many intricate technical legal discussions, he em-
phasizes that in the final analysis, the Rule Against Perpetuities is
"a system serving an important end of public policy. '51
Lewis's work, however, had little impact. Thus, perpetuities
law was not transformed until 1886 with the publication and sub-
sequent widespread acceptance of John Chipman Gray's treatise,
The Rule Against Perpetuities.2 Analytically, Gray's treatise con-
as "irrelevant." C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OI CONTRACT 15-21 (2d ed. 1880).
46. For a discussion of formalism in other fields of law, see G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT 5-53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as G. GILMORE, CONTRACT]; G. WHITE, TORT, supra
note 42, at 20-62.
47. W. LEWIS, supra note 12.
48. Id. at 48-49, 138 n.1, 357;,Bordwell, supra note 8, at 439. Scholars preceding Lewis
believed that the English view of perpetuities required the application of a variety of rules.
See H. RANDELL, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PERPETUITY AND ON TRUSTS OF ACCUMULATION 59,
63-65, 103 (1822).
49. W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at 47-49.
50. Id. at 48.
51. Id. at 138 n.1. For other references to policy, see id. at 118, 138-39, 289; H. RAN-
DELL, supra note 48, at 68, 88, 94, 103.
52. J. GRAY, PERPmETUTEs, aupra note 3. On Gray's acceptance and influence, see supra
text accompanying notes 4-6; infra notes 106-12. R. MARSDEN, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETU-
rmS 166-67 (1883), published in England three years before Gray's treatise, greatly antici-
pated Gray's transformation of perpetuities law. Marsden's work, however, was not as rigor-
ously systematic and formal, and was certainly less influential than Gray's treatise. The
contemporaneous appearance of Marsden's and Gray's work demonstrates that formalism
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sists of three parts. The first portion details a history of future
interests and perpetuities law." A comparatively brief section fol-
lows stating the Rule and its most important supporting doc-
trines.5 4 The final part, constituting more than one-half of the text,
argues for and explores the Rule's universal application.5 But de-
spite the divisions, the work is an organic whole, designed to sys-
tematize and formalize perpetuities law by reducing it to a single
rule, based on, and interpreted in terms of, legal conceptions and
legal history.
In general, Gray systematizes perpetuities law by depicting its
reduction to a single rule as the triumph of truth over error. He
stigmatizes the handling of perpetuities by diverse rules as the ju-
diciary's original and confused attempt to control remote limita-
tions.56 The Rule, in contrast, emerges from a "slow recognition" of
the "true form" of the law. 7 Gray constantly dismisses the contin-
ued adherence to the old rules as intellectual malingering.e
Gray formalizes perpetuities by treating it as a settled body of
doctrine whose content is grounded in, and deduced from, legal
conceptions. In his Preface, Gray explains:
In many legal discussions there is, in the last resort, nothing to
say but that one judge or writer thinks one way, and another
writer or judge thinks another way. There is no exact standard
to which appeal can be made. In questions of [perpetuities] this
is not so; there is for them a definite recognized rule: if a deci-
sion agrees with it, it is right; if it does not agree with it, it is
wrong. In no part of the law is the reasoning so mathematical in
its character; none has so small a human element.59
Gray introduces his treatise without mentioning a policy reason for
the law's proscription of remote limitations. Instead, he divorces
perpetuities law from its then-accepted purpose of promoting
alienability; the supposed relation, he claims, is one of the original
was becoming popular among late nineteenth-century jurists.
53. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, §§ 5-200; see also W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at
50-138 (history of future interests).
54. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, §§ 201-267. For a statement of the Rule, see
supra note 3.
55. Id. §§ 268-679.
56. See, e.g., id. §§ 140, 159, 168. Gray views the development of perpetuities law as
exemplifying the normal process of common-law development. See infra note 168. For an
alternative view of the early history ofperpetuities law, explaining its development in terms
of shifts in policy, see 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 93-114; Haskins, supra note 8.
57. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, §§ 159, 201.
58. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 75-91.
59. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, at ix.
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"misconception[s]" '  that "has led to grave practical errors." 61
Later in the treatise, Gray does state the "true" policy of perpetu-
ities law: protecting the market value of present estates.02 Not only
is this policy less compelling than the policy previously attributed
to perpetuities law,'s but it is lost among discussion, analysis, and
argument drawn from and about legal history, doctrine, precedent,
and conception.64 In other words, in part by reducing the underly-
ing policy's intrinsic significance, but more significantly by denying
it a role in legal analysis and argument, Gray sets the stage for its
being overlooked entirely. 5  Consequently, perpetuities law
emerges as nothing more than "do[ing] . . . sums correctly"66-a
logic in which legal conception, rather than policy, determines the
disposition of legal conflicts.
The mathematical design of Gray's conception of perpetuities
law is specifically and saliently illustrated by the central theme of
his work: the Rule's universal applicability. This was a novel pro-
position. Prior to Gray, the preponderance of judicial and scholarly
authority67 viewed the Rule as inapplicable to interests such as
contingent remainders, rights of entry, possibilities of reverter,
many limitations after entailed estates, and some executory inter-
ests.68 Nonetheless, Gray argues for the Rule's application, interest
by interest.6 "
Gray first discusses the rules controlling contingent remain-
ders.70 Before Gray, eminent authorities including Fearne, Butler,
Preston, Sugden, Williams, Sweet, Leake, and the only case on the
subject, Cole v. Sewel, 7 1 all expressed the opinion that contingent
60. Id. 9 2.
61. Id. § 3.
62. Id. § 269.
63. See supra note 9.
64. For a discussion of Gray's analysis and argument, see infra text accompanying
notes 70-97.
65. See Bordwell, supra note 21, at 734-36.
66. J. GRAY, PRPETumrrs, supra note 3, at ix.
67. See, e.g., H. CHALLIs, THE LAW o' REAL PROPERTY 139-40, 146-48 (1887); 7 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 231-38; Sweet, Perpetuities, 15 L.Q. REv. 71, 79-85 (1899);
cases cited by J. GRAY, PERPETUMES, supra note 3, §§ 287, 305-311. Only W. LEwis, supra
note 12, and R. MARSDEN, supra note 52, held views similar to Gray's.
68. Certain executory limitations after entailed estates are exempt from the Rule. See
infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
69. See J. GRAY, PERPETumpTs, supra note 3, §§ 268-628; infra text accompanying notes
73-97.
70. J. GRAY, PEmPruiTs, supra note 3, § 284.
71. 4 Dr. & War. 1, 28, 32 (Ir. Ch. 1843), aff'd, 2 H.L.C. 186, 9 Eng. Rep. 1062 (1848).
But cf. W. LEwis, supra note 12, at 80-85 (Supp. 1849) (narrowly construing the holding in
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remainders were outside the scope of the Rule.72 Yet Gray asserts
simply, "As the Rule governs all contingent equitable limitations
of real estate, and all contingent limitations, legal and equitable, of
personal property, whether in the form of remainders or not, it is
very desirable that legal contingent remainders. . . should be sub-
jected to the Rule also."' 73 Thus, by assuming systemization, Gray
places on others the burden of producing sufficient reasons to cre-
ate exceptions to the Rule.
Gray then turns to rebutting specifically his opponents' argu-
ments against the Rule's universal application. First, in the context
of contingent remainders, Gray's opponents contended that the
rule against limitations after the first limitation to an unborn per-
son sufficiently controlled perpetuities without the assistance of
the Rule.7' Gray refutes this contention by arguing that the "un-
born person" rule no longer exists. Drawing from his history sec-
tion, he shows that an earlier rule barring "double possibilities"'
spawned the "unborn person" rule.75 Developed in the 1590's, this
rule was one of the earliest judicial rules aimed at perpetuities and
subsequently was criticized and rejected as overly broad for void-
ing many future interests that the judiciary wished to allow. 76 Gray
reasons that the prohibition against limitations after a limitation
to an unborn person, as a derivative of a discarded rule, must itself
fall.7
Second, those who opposed the universal application of the
Rule contended that it did not govern contingent remainders be-
cause their common-law origins predated the development of the
Rule.78 The application of the Rule to contingent remainders
therefore would be judicial usurpation of the legislature's preroga-
Cole).
72. See Sweet, supra note 67, at 82-86.
73. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 284 (2d ed. 1906).
74. Id. § 287. For a discussion of this rule, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
75. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, §§ 287-293. The rule also is referred to as the
rule against a possibility upon a possibility. It required judges to distinguish between de-
grees of unlikelihood of occurrence. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 93-98; Bordwell,
Alienability and Perpetuities (pt. 5), 25 IOWA L. REv. 1, 9-15 (1939).
76. Holdsworth, Bordwell, and Sweet dispute Gray's contention that the rule against
double possibilities gave rise to the rule against limitations after a limitation to unborn
issue. They derive the "unborn person" rule from the long struggle to keep entailed estates
barrable. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 209-14; Bordwell, supra at 14-22; Sweet,
Contingent Remainders and Other Possibilities, 27 YALE L.J. 977, 981-85 (1918); supra text
accompanying notes 16-17.
77. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, § 290.
78. Id. § 296; see 2 T. JARMAN, TREATISE ON WILLS 734 (1845).
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tive to alter established law. But Gray again draws from his history
section to demonstrate that the Rule not only undoubtedly applies
to devises of leasehold estates, but that these are the very interests
the Rule was first formulated to control.7 9 He reasons that the de-
vise of leasehold estates is sanctioned by common law, and not the
Statute of Wills, because these estates are conceptually chattel and
not real interests. Thus, Gray concludes, the Rule is obviously ap-
plicable to common-law interests.80
Gray uses similar reasoning to extend the Rule's application to
rights of entry.81 As these rights are "common-law interests," they
"are within the Rule."82' Gray reviews's and minimizes the dozens
of American precedents upholding remotely vesting rights of en-
try84 and declares them illogical, arbitrary exceptions to the Rule
Against Perpetuities.8
Possibilities of reverter" presented Gray with more difficulty.
Indeed, his opinion as to the Rule's extension to possibilities of
reverter wavered over time. In the first edition, this future interest
is subject to the Rule, like any other nonvested common-law inter-
est.8 7 In subsequent editions of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
Gray views possibilities of reverter as vested and, therefore, not
voided by the Rule. The immunity of possibilities of reverter, he
79. J. GRAY, PERPrurEs, supra note 3, § 296.
S0. Id. §§ 297-298. Gray reminds us in his later work that the courts have the power to
change the law. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPrrurrms, supra note 73, § 296(a).
81. A right of entry is defined as "[t]he right of taking or resuming possession of land
by entering on it in a peaceable manner." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1190 (5th ed. 1979).
82. J. GRAY, PERPLrTuiEs, supra note 3, § 300.
83. Id. § 305-309.
84. Despite current usage that refuses to apply the Rule to rights of entry because they
are deemed "vested" for purposes of the Rule, see infra text accompanying note 109, it was
clear to Gray and his contemporaries that rights of entry were not vested interests. The
word vested derives from the Latin word vestire, meaning to clothe; a vested interest is
clothed with seisin. By legal conceptions, a right of entry had no seisin until breach of its
condition. Therefore, it is not a vested interest until breach. See J. GRAY, PERPgrvrrIms,
supra note 3, §§ 100, 114, 118 ("originally the word vestire meant ...to deliver the sei-
sin"); 12 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 159 (1933); cf. French v. Old South Soc'y, 106
Mass. 479 (1871) (court does not question the nonvested character of rights of entry); In re
Hollis Hosp., 2 Ch. D. 540 (1899). For a fuller, more detailed analysis of rights of entry, see 7
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 23-81.
85. J. GRAY, PERsPrrmEs, supra note 3, § 310.
86. A possibility of reverter is a future interest left in the transferor or his succes-
sor in fee simple determinable or in fee simple conditional. The special limita-
tion which characterizes a determinable fee is commonly introduced by words
like "until" or "so long as"; but a mere statement of purpose is not sufficient to
create a determinable fee.
L. SiMuS, FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 28-29.
87. J. GRAY, PERPTrrurT , supra note 3, § 312.
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decided, was a necessary consequence of the concept of determin-
able fees.8" Hence, the importance of Gray's insistence through all
of his editions that the Statute Quia Emptoressa barred fee simple
determinable estates and their attendant possibilities of reverter.'0
Thus, the uncertainty surrounding the treatment of possibilities of
reverter is moot; their very existence is conceivable, Gray observes,
only by the maxim "communis error facit jus."'
Although Gray's treatment of possibilities of reverter had con-
siderable support among treatise writers," two dozen English and
American cases seemed to disagree. Reviewing the cases at length
in his history section, Gray reduces all but one of them to no more
than "dicta," and dismisses the remaining case as incorrect.' 8
Finally, Gray acknowledges and approves of the Rule's inap-
plicability to future interests after entailed estates that vested
before or at the termination of the entailed estate. 4 Gray explains,
however, that conceptually, these future interests are present es-
tates" because they are completely destructible through a common
recovery brought by the present occupant."e Thus, rather than con-
found the Rule's universal application, Gray trumpets its exception
as illustrative of the Rule's concern for "the substance rather than
.. . the form of future limitations. ' '97
Given the unprecedented nature of many of Gray's specific
conclusions, the evident weakness of his supporting arguments, 8
88. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, supra note 73, § 312. If the Rule elimi-
nated possibilities of reverter, then determinable fees would lose their effectiveness because
the sanction of termination of the estate would be unavailable.
After Gray concluded that the Rule does not govern possibilities of reverter, he needed
to explain why a right of entry, which is the necessary consequence of a fee simple subject to
a condition subsequent, is not similarly exempt. The distinction, Gray says, is that a right of
entry divests the preceding estate, as an executory interest does, while a possibility of re-
verter does not. Id. § 312 n.1.
89. 1290, 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1. The House of Lords enacted this statute to grant feudal
subtenants free alienation of their fee estates.
90. J. GRAY, PERP'ETUITIES, supra note 3, §§ 31-41.
91. Id. § 312. This Latin phrase means a "common error, repeated many times, makes
law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 81, at 254.
92. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, § 36. For a list of proponents and opponents,
see Powell, Determinable Fees, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 210-11 (1923).
93. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, §§ 33-38.
94. Id. §§ 203, 443-447.
95. Id. § 443. According to Gray, future interests after entailed estates that vest with
the termination of the entailed estate are "not regarded as an interest at all." Id. § 203.
96. See id.
97. Id. § 203.
98. See, e.g., 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 233. One weakness is offered by Pow-
ell, who suggests that Gray's attempt to explain the Rule's treatment of possibilities of re-
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and the novelty of his general conception, it is understandable that
some of his eminent contemporaries responded critically. Charles
Sweet published a defense of the rule against limitations after a
limitation to an unborn person; 9 Richard Powell argued for the
post-Quia Emptores validity of possibilities of reverter; 100 William
Holdsworth disputed much of Gray's history;' 0' Jabez Fox sug-
gested that Gray's separation of perpetuities law from the policy
favoring alienability exemplified a jurisprudence that substituted
"principles . . .the writer would be glad to see recognized. . .[for
those] which the courts have seen fit to adopt."'' 2
Despite the controversy and criticism of his work, Gray's trea-
tise was, and continues to be, popular and influential. 03 Yet Gray's
influence has not been in terms of substantive result. For example,
after the treatise's publication, English courts firmly reasserted the
rule against limitations after a limitation to unborn persons.
0 4
Further, American courts persisted in upholding and exempting
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry from the Rule.1
0 5
Gray's real influence has been in terms of his overall approach,
methodology, and conception of perpetuities law. With Gray, the
image of perpetuities law became systematic and formal. His one-
sentence Rule became the "classical statement,"' 06 "the focal point
about which to organize .. . thinking,' 0 7 and his mathematical
verter using the Statute Quia Emptores, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1, is meaningless because the
statute's intent remains intact regardless of the ultimate disposition of these future inter-
ests. Powell, supra note 92, at 211.
99. Sweet, supra note 67, at 71; see Firth, Legal Remainders and Perpetuities, 14 L.Q.
REV. 133 (1898). But see Vaizey, Remoteness and Perpetuity, 6 L.Q. REV. 410 (1890); Wil-
liams, Contingent Remainders, 14 L.Q. REV. 234 (1898) (supporting Gray).
100. Powell, supra note 92. H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 93 (2d ed. 1920),
also criticized Gray's treatise. But see A. KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL
CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS 302 (1920).
101. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 210 n.11, 211, 232-34. Although Holdsworth
disagrees with Gray on the history of the "older" rules, he is highly complimentary of Gray's
treatment of the rise of the rule against remote vesting and relies on him extensively. Id. at
215.
102. Fox, supra note 8, at 200. Gray responded to Fox in Gray, Remoteness of Charita-
ble Gifts, 7 HARv. L. REV. 406 (1894) [hereinafter cited as Gray, Remoteness].
103. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Whitby v. Mitchell, 44 Ch. D. 85 (1890) (the case for which the rule is
named). Parliament abolished the rule in the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 20,
§ 161.
105. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 68, 94-96; L.
SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 264. England, however, followed Gray. See In re
Hollis Hosp., 2 Ch. D. 540, 552 (1899) (citing Gray as a "learned American author").
106. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 183
(1966).
107. L. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 264.
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style of elaboration the norm. The American refusal to apply the
Rule to rights of entry and possibilities of reverter now is concep-
tualized and tolerated as an "historical anomaly," rather than ex-
plained as a debatable policy choice.10 8 Often, it is masked entirely
by terming these future interests "vested." 109 When remembered
at all, the rule against limitations after a limitation to an unborn
person is explained as a transitional doctrine-an imperfect formu-
lation reflecting movement away from the absurd "double possibil-
ity" principle towards the current rule.110 The conventional wis-
dom envisions Gray as restoring, not reordering, perpetuities
law.' Few, if any, commentators share Professor Bordwell's in-
sight that Gray took "a great field of property law like Perpetuities
and confin[ed] it to a narrow, mechanistic rule against remoteness
of vesting [that] he came to exalt as if it were an end in itself
IV. GRAY'S JURISPRUDENCE AND CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN
PERPETUITIES AND PROPERTY LAW
The preceding analysis of the history of perpetuities law il-
luminates a number of contemporary issues in property law. Most
immediately, it exposes the current controversy over the reform of
perpetuities law, placing it in a larger perspective. For over thirty
years, the movement to reform the Rule,"' although achieving
some notable successes," 4 has met with substantial resistance and
108. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 95; T. BERGIN & P.
HASKELL, supra note 106, at 209; 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY V 769[2] (1977);
L. SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 280-81.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 94; see also 5 R. POWELL,
supra note 108, 1 76911 n.2; E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 119
(Supp. 1981); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HAv. L. REv. 638, 647 (1938). This
completely drains the term of any meaning. Compare the American conception of vested
rights with Gray's formulation, supra note 84.
110. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, 1 763. Gray specifically refutes this theory. See J.
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, supra note 73, § 298(h). For the correct history of
the rule against limitations after a limitation to an unborn person, see Sweet, supra note 29,
at 387-99.
111. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 106, at 183.
112. Bordwell, supra note 21, at 734-35 (footnote omitted); see also Bordwell, Aliena-
bility and Perpetuities (pt. 1), IoWA L. Rv. 437, 439-40 (1937).
113. The movement is conventionally dated from 1947 when Pennsylvania enacted re-
form legislation. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (Purdon 1975). For a review of the
various reform proposals, see 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, 11 827A-827F; L. SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 260-61, 269-79; Schuyler, The Statute Concerning Perpetuities,
65 Nw. U.L. REv. 3, 18-28 (1970).
114. Both England and the Restatement (Second) of Property have adopted major re-
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remains a minority position. 15 Several books, commentaries,"' and
over one hundred law review articles have heatedly debated Gray's
Rule and his critics' counterproposals.117 Yet traditionalists and re-
formers'1 8 generally agree on the goal that perpetuities law does
and should pursue: " 9 a measured restraint on alienability20 that
concomitantly respects the desire of past, present, and future gen-
erations to do what they wish with the wealth they enjoy.' Con-
sistent with this objective, traditionalists and reformers alike be-
lieve that there must be some ultimate limit to dead hand
control.'22
forms. For a discussion of England's Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964 ch. 55, see
Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REV. 486 (1964); see also Lynn, Per-
petuities Reform: An Analysis of Developments in England and the United States, 113 U.
PA. L. REV. 508 (1965) (examining a "wait and see" version of the Rule); Comment, Rule
Against Perpetuities: The Second Restatement Adopts Wait and See, 19 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1063, 1066-81 (1979) (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 1.4-.5 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1979)).
115. For a survey of jurisdictions modifying the classic Rule, see RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 87-92, 118-22; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, TT 808-827;
L. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 273-79; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY 127-54 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1978) (Professor Powell's critical analysis of Restate-
ment (Second)'s Reporter's claims regarding reform's acceptance).
116. For a bibliography on recent perpetuities reform, see 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108,
827G. The Restatement (Second) of Property and Comment, supra note 114, should be
added to this list. The leading material cited in 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, urging reform
is by Professor Leach; the leading material opposing reform is by Professors Mechem and
Simes. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, §§ 1.4.-.5 (Professor
Casner's remarks as Reporter); 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, T 827F[31 (Professor Rohan's
opposing analysis).
117. See, e.g., 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, V 827F. See generally Leach, Perpetuities
Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124, 1124-26, 1152-54 (1960) (arguing
for codification of a rule against perpetuities) [hereinafter cited as Leach, Perpetuities
Legislation].
118. In this article, those scholars who advocate substantial preservation of Gray's for-
mulation of the Rule are denominated "traditionalists," while those who advocate substan-
tial reform are called "reformers."
119. See generally Fetters, Perpetuities: The Wait-and-See Disaster-A Brief Reply
to Professor Maudsley, With a Few Asides to Professors Leach, Simes, Wade, Dr. Morris,
et al., 60 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 381-87, 407-14 (1975) (review of policy reasons supporting
Rule).
120. See, e.g., J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 13-18 (1956); L.
SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 1, at 32-71; Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsyl-
vania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 965, 966-69 (1959); Schuyler, Should the
Rule Against Perpetuities Discard its Vest? (pt. 1), 56 MICH. L. REV. 683, 688-93 (1958).
121. See authorities cited supra note 114; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, 762; Leach,
supra note 117, at 1142. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 1, at 58, first examined the
Rule's limited effect on the transferability of wealth. For a lone dissent from this view, see
Fetters, supra note 119, at 407-14.
122. The reformed Rule does tend to allow somewhat more dead hand control than the
original formulation. See Comment, supra note 114, at 1079-80.
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Agreement ceases, however, when the legal scholars turn from
the analysis of proper ends of perpetuities law to the selection of
means to those ends. The reformers' central indictment of Gray's
formulation is that because perpetuities only marginally promotes
an important policy, and because only unskilled attorneys run
their clients afoul of the Rule's strictures, the current law too
quickly and harshly overrides donor's intentions. 2 3 It would be
better, they suggest, not to upset a disposition unless it in fact
vests too remotely, 12 4 and then limit the damage by reforming the
disposition to reflect the donor's intent as closely as possible while
complying with the law. 12 5 Traditionalists, however, object to the
judicial discretion and the uncertainty that these reforms engen-
der, and see no need to encourage sloppy draftsmanship. 2 6 In-
stead, they urge specific statutory proscription of the few unac-
ceptable conclusions reached by the Rule's remorseless "any
possibilities" logic.' 27 These amendments, they argue, will fashion
a rule that is nondiscretionary and predictable, yet devoid of ab-
surd application.
Although couched in terms of policy, the debate between tra-
ditionalists and reformers concerns matters of technique, rather
than the goals of perpetuities law. Nevertheless, the argument is
impassioned and interminable because the different methods of in-
terpreting the Rule reflect irreconcilable jurisprudential notions of
how law should be structured and operated. The struggle, in effect,
focuses on the extent to which perpetuities law should shed its for-
malist past.
123. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 93-94; Leach, Per-
petuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REv. 721 (1952);
Schuyler, supra note 120, at 693-708.
124. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 1.4; L. SIMES, Fu-
TURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 270-75; Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, supra note 117, at
1138-40; Schuyler, supra note 120, at 720-22. This is known as the "wait-and-see" approach.
125. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 1.5; L. SIMES, Fu-
TURE INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 275-77; Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, supra note 117, at
1149-51; Schuyler, supra note 120, at 722-25. This is known as the "cy pres" approach.
Another proposal, developed by Professor Schuyler but generally overlooked by others, is to
reform the requirement of vesting. See L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 1, at 80-83.
126. See, e.g., 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, 827F[3](c)-(h); Mechem, supra note 120,
at 980-83.
127. See, e.g., Bordwell, Perpetuities From the Point of View of the Draughtsman, 11
RUTGERS L. REV. 429, 435 (1956); Fetters, supra note 119, at 399; Mechem, supra note 120,
at 983. Examples of the rules condemned by the traditionalists include the "fertile octogena-
rian," the "unborn widow," and the "magic gravel pit." See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 1.4 comments e, f & k; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 108, 1 827E;
Schuyler, supra note 120, at 698-701.
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One of the essential features of formalism, if not all nine-
teenth-century jurisprudence, is the resolution of controversies by
the remorseless application of general principles, conceptions, or
rules.1' s Jurists recognized the problems inherent in this approach:
the application of rules to cases in which their underlying reasons
only faintly apply, the disregard of factual detail, and the all-or-
nothing quality of the result reached.' 2 ' But the problems were
thought to be outweighed by the rules' long-term benefits, not the
least of which was that predictable rules foster self-government. 30
Contemporary jurisprudence stands in contrast.'3' It uses doc-
trines, such as "reasonableness" and "best interests of the child,"
that emphasize facts and allow judicial flexibility. The focus is on
pragmatic, individualized justice.32
The reformers' doctrines-for example, "wait-and-see" 33 and
"cy pres"' 34-reflect, draw from, and are sustained by, this con-
temporary jurisprudential current just as Gray was by formalism.
Even the traditionalists concede the force of contemporary juris-
prudence by joining the reformers and condemning the "fertile
octogernarian" and certain other conclusions of the classic Rule.3 5
To some extent they too have departed from the nineteenth-cen-
tury's vision of perpetuities law, and to some extent they are re-
formers. But although the traditionalists' condemnation of a few of
the Rule's absurd conclusions is inconsistent with a strictly formal
128. See P. ATIYAH, CONTRACT, 8upra note 42, at 345-58, 398-405; P. ATIYAH, FROM
PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM 5-26 (1978) [hereinafter cited as P. ATIYAH, PRINCIPLES]; G. GIL-
MORE, CONTRACT, supra note 46, at 14-22.
129. P. ATYAH, PRINCIPLES, supra note 128, at 14-17; G. GILMORE, CONTRACT, supra
note 46, at 14-47.
130. P. ATIYAH, CONTRACT, supra note 42, at 346-58; P. ATIYAH, PRINCIPLES, supra note
128, at 18-21, 24-25; cf. G. GILMORE, AGES, supra note 42, at 64-67 (briefly exploring birth
and impact of laissez-faire government); M. HoRwrrz, supra note 42, at 266 (briefly explor-
ing the forces moving American law towards formalism).
131. Contemporary jurisprudence has a variety of strands, including "realism," "rea-
soned elaboration," and "consensus thought." For general surveys of the modes of twenti-
eth-century jurisprudence, see G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 97-163
(1978); G. WHITE, TORT, supra note 42; Ackerman, Book Review, 103 DAEDALUS 119 (1974).
Despite their marked differences, the strands are sufficiently similar when compared to for-
malism to allow their grouping in this article. See infra note 132. Professor Gilmore has
spotted a recent trend-a group of "neo-conceptualist" philosophies, chiefly in the law and
economics school-that may be exceptions to this generalization. See G. GILMORE, AGES,
supra note 42, at 107-18.
132. See P. ATIYAH, CONTRACT, supra note 42, at 649-59, 678-80; P. ATIYAH, PRINCIPLES,
supra note 128, at 12, 14, 30; G. GILMORE, CONTRACT, supra note 46, at 78-81.
133. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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view, it insufficiently resolves the dichotomy between rule-based
and individualized justice that distinguishes contemporary and
traditional doctrines.
An example advanced by Professor Mechem illustrates the
traditionalists' position. He suggests that after eliminating the
Rule's few unacceptable conclusions, it resembles the formalities
required for a valid will, one of many rules "limiting the effective-
ness of human activity because of supposed considerations of pub-
lic policy."' 36 The invalidation of an improperly witnessed or
signed will does not bother Mechem. Nevertheless, many people
object to the intended beneficiaries' losing in just such a case, espe-
cially when the fault lay with the testator's lawyer, who could and
should have done better.137
The point is not that the reformers are correct because their
proposals coincide with "contemporary" jurisprudence. Modern ju-
risprudence has its problematic facets, including lack of certainty,
which the reform measures doubtlessly share. 138 Further, as a pol-
icy matter, the reform proposals unfortunately tend to extend an
already generous amount of dead hand control. 3 9 Rather, the
point is that the reformers' appeal is based on the congruence be-
tween their ideas and contemporary jurisprudence. This conform-
ity is the force that, despite the reform proposals' defects, is over-
whelming the classic Rule, and may overwhelm the traditionalists'
counterproposals as well.
Gray's influence on property law also extends beyond perpetu-
ities to the interpretation of dispositive instruments, especially dis-
positions involving perpetuities or remainders. Part of Gray's influ-
ence is gained by negative inference; he generally does not discuss
the interpretation of dispositions in his treatise and criticizes pre-
vious works for having done 80.140
Gray considered interpretation of instruments a separate legal
science distinct from perpetuities law; "[tiherefore every provision
in a will or settlement is to be construed as if the Rule did not
exist, and then to the provision so construed the Rule is to be re-
136. Mechem, supra note 120, at 967.
137. The contemporary view is reaffirmed when a court holds that the Rule is so com-
plex that the offending attorney is not guilty of malpractice. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56
Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
138. See P. ATIYAH, PRINCIPLES, supra note 128, at 29-32; supra note 126.
139. See Comment, supra note 114, at 1079-80; see also Bordwell, supra note 127, at
434-35.
140. J. GRAY, PERPETurrms, supra note 3, at iv.
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morselessly applied.""'1 As this passage from the Rule Against
Perpetuities indicates, Gray favored an inflexible, mechanistic
technique for interpreting dispositive instruments; his formalist
methodology denies the legitimacy of construing limitations in
light of a pragmatic look at the consequences of their interpreta-
tion. 42 The continued quotation, citation, and use of this passage
evidences its influence.""
Ironically, most of Gray's influence in this area is due to one of
his few departures from his refusal to consider questions of inter-
pretation. In his analysis of the distinction between vested and
contingent remainders, he writes:
Whether a remainder is vested or contingent depends upon the
language employed. If the conditional element is incorporated
into the description of, or into the remainder-man, then the re-
mainder is contingent; but if, after words giving a vested inter-
est, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is vested.""
This rule, which seems to confine the search for the draftsman's
intent to a debate over word sequence, is certainly mechanistic. 4 s
The rule is also immensely influential, as evidenced by its frequent
use by courts'14 and commentators."
7
Arguably, Gray's influence on interpretive technique is not
confined to perpetuities law and the construction of remainders.
By serving as a paradigm of correct technique, his formalist ap-
141. Id. § 629.
142. Compare Gray's approach to the interpretation of dispositions with RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 241-243 comment n (1936) (illustrating and legitimatizing approach
that Gray finds unacceptable).
143. See, e.g, First Ala. Bank v. Adams, 382 So. 2d 1104, 1107 (Ala. 1980); Bell v. Harri-
son, 10 Or. App. 113, 115, 498 P.2d 397, 398 (1972); Hagemann v. National Bank & Trust
Co., 218 Va. 333, 342, 237 S.E.2d 388, 393 (1977).
144. J. GRAY, PERPrums, supra note 3, § 108.
145. Compare T. BEROIN & P. HASKELL, supra 106, at 75 with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROPERTY §§ 241-243 (1936) (rules regulating possessory and future interests). Gray's test
seems a "dispute over word sequence" because it causes lawyers to minimize word choice as
a factor in interpretation. Compare Edwards v. Hammond, 3 Lev. 131, 83 Eng. Rep. 614
(K.B. 1683) (ambiguity in dispositive instrument caused by choice of words resolved by de-
termining testator's probable intent) with the treatment of Edwards by C. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 9, at 121-23 (resolution of ambiguity seems determined by form and placement of
words).
146. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. First Nat'l Bank, 348 So. 2d 1359, 1364 (Ala. 1977); Sec-
ond Nat'l Bank v. Harris Trust & Savs. Bank, 29 Conn. Supp. 275, 281, 283 A.2d 226, 229-30
(Super Ct. 1971); Loeb v. Loeb, 261 Ind. 193, 198-99, 301 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1973); In re
Estate of Unitt, 197 Neb. 713, 716, 250 N.W.2d 644, 647 (1977).
147. See, e.g., T. BEROIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 106, at 75; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note
9, at 121-22.
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proach to interpretation may have a more pervasive influence.' "
Gray himself argued in another highly regarded work, The Nature
and Sources of the Law, 4 9 that mechanistic interpretation was
uniquely suited to property dispositions regardless of whether per-
petuities or remainders were involved.150
Despite Gray's direct or indirect influence, his views certainly
reflect and support the present conventional approach to constru-
ing dispositive instruments. In contrast to other areas of law, 51 the
search for the draftsman's intent in property dispositions is still
frequently seen as appropriately accomplished through heavy reli-
ance on formal and mechanistic rules.15 This view is so dominant
today that many commentators are at a loss to explain the disposi-
tion of cases that are neither determined by, nor predicated on,
Gray's rules except by resorting to vulgar legal realism. The rules,
they say, are meaningless and incoherent, serving as a convenient
method for rationalizing decisions that are based on other, unar-
ticulated grounds.'
Yet there are some scholars (and some cases) whose approach
to questions of construction illustrate a flexible and pragmatic
search for the draftsman's intent.'" In short, like perpetuities law,
the construction of property dispositions currently involves a
struggle between formalism and contemporary notions of
jurisprudence.
Finally, this study of Gray's influence demonstrates that the
148. It seems to have an effect on the author's students and colleagues.
149. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCEBS OF THE LAw (2d ed. 1921) (hereinafter cited as
J. GRAY, NATURE]. This treatise influenced at least one contemporary commentator's discus-
sion of the interpretation of property dispositions. See A. KALcs, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 90-
109 (1913).
150. J. GRAY, NATURE, supra note 149, at 173-78.
151. Examples include the interpretation of contracts and statutes.
152. See, e.g., Werling v. Grosse, 76 IM. App. 3d 834, 839-40, 395 N.E.2d 629, 633-34
(1979); Page v. Nissen, 254 A.2d 592, 595 (Me. 1969); Hagerman v. Board of Educ., 112 N.J.
Super. 221, 223, 270 A.2d 736, 737 (Ch. Div. 1970); First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 27 Or.
App. 103, 107, 555 P.2d 477, 479 (1976).
153. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 106, at v-x, 75; Dunham, Possibility of
Reverter and Powers of Termination-Fraternal or Identical Twins?, 20 U. CHI L. REv.
215, 216-17 (1953).
154. See, e.g., Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958); Brown-
ing v. Sacrison, 267 Or. 645, 518 P.2d 656 (1974); Grayson v. Holloway, 203 Tenn. 464, 313
S.W.2d 555 (1948); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 241-248 (1936); RABIN, The Law
Favors the Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1965); Schuyler, The Art of
Interpretation in Future Interest Cases, 17 VAND. L. Rav. 1407 (1964). The Restatement of
Property has directly attacked Gray's refusal to construe limitations without regard to the
Rule Against Perpetuities's application. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 243 com-
ment n (1936).
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dominant concept of property law as being heavily rooted in medi-
eval jurisprudence-a notion summed up by Justice Holmes's oft-
repeated aphorism that property law "is a matter of history that
has not forgotten Lord Coke""'5 -is in need of substantial revision.
Certainly current perpetuities law, Gray's classic Rule, is not
founded on the jurisprudence of Coke's time, but on the jurispru-
dence of Gray, Holmes, 5 Tiffany,"5 7 and other formalist jurists.
The judiciary of Coke's time based the rules of perpetuities on pol-
icy goals. They often discussed policy in their analysis, and cre-
ated, used, strained, or overruled various doctrines as the desired
result seemed to require.' This concern for policy was in accord
with the then-dominant style of jurisprudence that regarded the
"wise" result as the end of the law.' Around 1700, well after
Coke's time, common-law jurisprudence turned away from the pur-
suit of wisdom and towards the goal of certainty. 160 Although this
change, which was fully reflected in perpetuities law, involved a
mechanistic legal method, it substantially differed from the mech-
anistic thought and technique that characterized late nineteenth-
century formalism. This earlier era sought certainty through rigid
adherence to its inherited mosaic of rules; courts adhered to au-
thority of any sort, even dicta, regardless of whether it was cor-
rect.' Formalism, in contrast, sought certainty by inducing a few
155. Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918).
156. Holmes is conventionally regarded as a pragmatic realist jurisprudent. See
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Holmes, Privilege, Malice and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). But Professor Gilmore, focusing on Holmes's earlier work,
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881), sees him as a formalist. See G. GILMORE, CON-
TRACT, supra note 46. Professor Horwitz, in his unpublished 1981 Rosenthal Lectures at
Northwestern University Law School, expressed similar views. See also Gordon, Holmes'
Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719, 721-31 (1982)
(Holmes's early scholarship exhibited diverse tendencies).
157. See H. TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1912).
158. See, e.g., Child v. Baylie, Cro. Jac. 459, 461-62, 79 Eng. Rep. 393, 394-95 (K.B.
1791); Ramsey v. Bradford, Palmer 336, 336, 81 Eng. Rep. 1111, 1111 (K.B. 1623); Pills v.
Brown, Palmer 131, 138, 81 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1016 (K.B. 1620) (Dodderidge, J., dissenting);
Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 124a-25a, 138b-39b, 76 Eng. Rep. 270, 283-86, 321-22
(K.B. 1595); 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 82-83, 121-24, 130-34, 197-202, 205-12, 219;
Haskins, supra note 8. This is especially clear in the case generally cited as the origin of the
Rule, The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682), in which Chancel-
lor Nottingham overruled Child v. Baylie and imposed as a limit to dead hand control the
antithesis of a formalist rule: his estimation of "inconvenience" and "mischief." Id. at 953.
For a late example of this approach, see Reeve v. Long, 3 Lev. 408, 83 Eng. Rep. 754 (H.L.
1695), discussed in 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 106-07.
159. See Siegel, supra note 35, at 50-53.
160. Id. at 51-53, 55-58.
161. See id. at 56-58. In the perpetuities area, all four of the most important precedents
of this period establish rules to achieve absolute certainty. See Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Clark &
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principles or rules from its inherited mosaic, and rigidly applying
them regardless of precedent." 2 As Samuel Williston, a leading
formalist jurisprudent, observed: "Stare decisis, or follow the
precedents was the old legal maxim. For this in effect [formalists]
substituted stare principiis, follow the principles, even if they
overthrow some decisions." '16 s
V. CONCLUSION
This article clarifies some current ideas on the nature of legal
formalism. By examining the jurisprudential basis of Gray's work
and its popularity, this article parallels Professor Gilmore's work
on the impact of formalist legal scholarship on American law.
1 e4
Like Gilmore's work, this article demonstrates that late nine-
teenth-century legal scholars creatively drew the preexisting dispa-
rate elements of law into objective, abstract, and theoretical
schemas.' 6 But Gilmore's conclusion that formalist revisions of
law involved obvious misstatements of precedent"'- is not sup-
ported here. Gray's revision did not suffer from this infirmity.
Gray conceived of law as a progressive science. e7 He acknowl-
Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833) (period of permissible remoteness includes twenty-one
years as term in gross); Dormer v. Packhurst, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127 (H.L. 1740)
(remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders vested); Leake v. Robinson, 3 Mer.
363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817) (limitations to class valid or void as unity; if class member
offends Rule, entire class takes nothing); Jee v. Audley, 1 9ox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch.
1787) (any possibility of remote vesting, no matter how unreasonable, voids the interest).
Critical scholarship generally concludes that at least three of these cases, Cadell, Leake, and
Dormer, gave greater weight to generally accepted but unsubstantiated professional opinion
than to doctrinal consistency and correctness. See J. GRAY, Pmwrmurrs, supra note 3,
§§ 1186-1187; 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 111-14; A. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at
215; Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARv. L. Rey. 1329,
1332-46 (1938).
162. G. GILMORE, CONTRACT, supra note 46, at 23-34; Gray, Remoteness, supra note
102. This is what Gray did in much of his treatise on perpetuities. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 71-91.
163. S. WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 205 (1940). Williston concludes, "When we were seek-
ing the answer to a problem in my student days the words 'on principle' were often on our
lips. Years later the phrase became anathema to another school of legal thinkers who were
disposed to question logical categories." Id. Not surprisingly, Williston describes Gray as
someone who "believed in the fundamental correctness" of the stare principiis approach.
Id. at 204.
164. G. GILMORE, CONTRACT, supra note 46.
165. Gilmore's thesis is generalized in his subsequent work, G. GILMORE, AGES, supra
note 42. Gilmore's proposition is exemplified in the work of Langdell, Holmes, and Willis-
ton, who transformed the various areas of bills, notes, and building and employment agree-
ments into a single law of contract. See G. GILMORE, CONTRACT, supra note 46, at 5-34.
166. G. GILMORE, CONTRACT, supra note 46, at 23-34.
167. See J. GRAY, NATURE, supra note 149, at 136-38, 141-44, 224, 231, 236-40, 308-09;
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edged that perpetuities law differed in the past, yet conceptualized
it as continuously evolving towards his views. 68 Like Newton in
physics, 6 9 Gray saw himself as building on the studies of others to
induce the final, "true form" of the law. 170 He structured and exe-
cuted his treatise accordingly. The "errors" Gray found in the
work of others, however, flowed from their different jurisprudential
premises. 1 Gray may be faulted for assuming, and not debating,
the philosophical framework that underlay his treatise. 72 But once
one is cognizant of Gray's interpretive framework, his work on per-
petuities openly and fully reveals the tradition from which he de-
parted. In other words, contemporary scholars may discern "mis-
statements" in the conclusions of formalist scholars only because
they accept yet another jurisprudential viewpoint.
Gray, Remoteness, supra note 102, at 407-08.
168. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, §§ 142, 154, 159, 201; Gray, Remoteness,
supra note 102, at 407-08.
169. Gray explicitly refers to the physical and mathematical sciences in general, and
Newton's work in particular, to Olescribe the work of a legal scientist. See J. GRAY, NATURE,
supra note 149, at 101, 225; J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, at v.
170. J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, at vi. Commenting on his achievements,
Newton noted: "If I have seen further . . . it is by standing upon shoulders of Giants."
Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, c. 1675), quoted in J. BARTLETT, FAMIL-
IAR QUOTATIONS 379 (14th ed. 1968).
Despite Gray's perception of the law as evolutionary, he viewed perpetuities and prop-
erty law as unique areas that already had completely evolved. See J. GRAY, NATURE, supra
note 149, at 173-76; J. GRAY, PERPETUITIES, supra note 3, at v.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39, 158-61.
172. Gray later discussed his jurisprudence in J. GRAY, NATURE, supra note 149, and
Gray, Remoteness, supra note 102. This article's treatment of Gray as a formalist contrasts
with scholarship that views him as one of the first legal pragmatists or realists. See, e.g., E.
PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 76, 159 (1973); MacCormick, A Political Fron-
tier of Jurisprudence: John Chipman Gray on the State, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 973 (1981);
Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A
Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 861, 865, 876-77 (1981). These other scholars base their views on Gray's later
work. Perhaps Gray's attitude changed over time. Yet even in his later work, Gray treated
property law formally, not pragmatically. See Gray, Release and Discharge of Powers, 24
HARV. L. REV. 511 (1911). Additionally, Samuel Williston, one of Gray's students in the
earlier period, remembers him as a formalist. S. WILLISTON, supra note 163, at 204-05; see
Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HARV. L. REV. 681, 681
(1916).
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